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Avoiding ‘negligence and profusion’: The ownership and organisation of Anglo-Indian 
trading firms, 1813 – 1870. 
Michael Aldous, Queens University Belfast 
Introduction 
“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers of other people’s 
money than their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own … negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.” (Adam Smith, 1787)1 
The rescinding of the East India Company’s (EIC) monopoly on trade between Britain and India 
in 1813 opened new opportunities for British trading firms. The volume and value of the Anglo-
Indian trade grew and the range of products imported and exported became progressively more 
varied, enabling increased opportunities for specialisation and integration. The trading firms 
expanded their activities and integrated into manufacturing, transportation and construction of 
infrastructure, resulting in many becoming highly diversified organisations, particularly after 
1850.  
In the period from 1813 to 1870, different types of firm emerged to undertake the trade. 
Entrepreneurs utilised a range of ownership forms including the partnership, joint-stock and 
hybrid models. There was also a wide variation in organisational structures and governance 
mechanisms employed, ranging from integrated hierarchies to networks of firms and partners. 
Novel forms of firm organisation emerged such as the ‘managing agency’ which saw trading 
firms function as both investors and managers of manufacturing, mining and plantation 
operations.  
                                                          
1 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (Oxford University Press, 
1998), 741. 
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The selection of ownership form became a significant choice for entrepreneurs in the mid-19th 
century after changes in legislation substantially lowered the costs of incorporation.2 
Entrepreneurs had to weigh up the pros and cons of different ownership and organisational forms 
that would best enable them to carry out their various activities. They experimented with 
different forms to better maximise opportunities and overcome the constraints they faced as the 
economic and business environment developed in both Britain and India.  
The use of a range of firm types in this period opens a number of questions that this thesis 
explores: 
I. How did the ownership, organisational structures and governance arrangements of 
Anglo-Indian trading firms change between 1813 and 1870, and did one or other form 
proliferate?  
II. Why were certain forms of ownership and organisation preferred, and which factors 
determined an entrepreneur’s choice of form?  
III. Did the choice of ownership and governance affect the performance of the firms? 
Authors including Chapman and Jones have analysed changes in these firms over this period.  
They described an evolutionary transformation from small partnerships, conducting a wide range 
of trading activities, to diversified business groups known as managing agents.3 The key factors 
that affected the decisions regarding ownership and organisation were identified as access to 
credit, capital, and managerial talent, whilst the capacity to diversify risk but allow the retention 
of control and capacity to extract profits by small numbers of owners was also important. The 
                                                          
2 In Britain the passage of the Companies Act of 1844, the Limited Liability Act of 1855 and the Joint-
Stock Companies Act of 1856 all lowered the costs of incorporation. In India, similar acts were passed in 
1850 and 1857.  
3 Stanley Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, British trading 
companies in the 19th and 20th centuries (Oxford University Press, 2000).  
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managing agents’ capacity to solve these challenges saw them come to dominate the 
organisation of Indian industry by the beginning of the 20th century.4    
Using an analytical framework drawn from the economic theory of the firm literature, the thesis 
reassesses the narrative of the Anglo-Indian trading firms. Drawing on transaction and agency 
cost theory a different, although potentially complementary, reading of the development of the 
firms is proposed. The thesis analyses how entrepreneurs experimented with different forms of 
business organisation that allowed them to lower the costs of transacting for credit, capital and 
information, whilst lowering the costs of controlling agents separated by distance and time.  
This analysis contributes to the debates in business and economic history focused on the role 
played by business ownership and organisational forms on the performance of firms, industries 
and economies. The importance of hierarchical managerial structures and joint-stock ownership 
in enabling an unprecedented expansion of the scale of business in the late 19th century is widely 
debated, and a growing literature has looked at the role played by different forms of business 
organisation, such as the partnership and cooperative, in enabling economic growth.5 This thesis 
demonstrates the important role played by hybrid forms of firm ownership in mitigating the 
‘negligence and profusion’ of joint-stock firms predicted by Adam Smith, whilst enabling 
increasing levels of capital investment.  
Methodology and sources 
To examine these questions the thesis categorised the trading firms typologically and 
chronologically, identifying four distinct firm types. First, the agency houses active as the 
monopoly was rescinded. Second, the trading firms that emerged after a financial crisis in 
Calcutta in the 1830s led to the failure of the principal agency houses. Third, the managing 
                                                          
4 Maria Misra, Business, Race, and Politics in British India, c. 1850–1960 (Oxford University Press, 
1999), 4, estimated that 75 per cent of all Indian industrial capital was controlled by managing agents in 
the early 20th century.  
5 Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: Managerial Revolution in American Business (Harvard University 
Press, 1977), Naomi Lamoreaux, et al. “Beyond markets and hierarchies: Towards a new synthesis of 
American Business History,” American Historical Review 108:2 (2003). 
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agents that became prominent from the 1850s onwards. All these firms were all organised as 
partnerships prior to 1870. The final type to be analysed were firms that integrated production 
and marketing processes. These were increasingly organised as joint-stock firms, incorporated 
in Calcutta and London.6  
Case studies of the four firm types were selected. John Palmer and Co. was founded before 1813 
and is investigated as an example of the agency houses. Gisborne and Co., founded in 1830, was 
a trading firm that emerged after the collapse of the agency houses. Ogilvy, Gillanders and Co. 
was established in 1826 as a trading firm but evolved into a managing agency in the years after 
1840. The Assam Company was incorporated in 1839 for the purpose of producing and 
marketing tea.7  
The case studies are analysed using a framework influenced by the Analytic narratives approach 
proposed by Bates et al.8 This method examines historical phenomena using formal arguments 
drawn from social science theory. A narrative, constructed from the case studies, outline actors’ 
decisions, the context in which they are made, and their outcomes. In this thesis, the choice of 
business form and the proliferation or failure of certain business types are analysed through 
transaction and agency cost theory.  
The theory provides propositions with which to analyse the narrative and examine the extent to 
which the theory explains these outcomes. The nature of the transactions, particularly the need 
to avoid threats of hold-up, incentivised firms to use different governance mechanisms, from 
buying through the market, to contractual partnerships, to being fully internalised within the 
firm. Similarly, different agency costs such as opportunism, minority oppression, and untimely 
                                                          
6 These firms bear resemblance to the Free-Standing Companies analysed by Mira Wilkins & Harn 
Schröter eds. The Free-Standing company in the world economy, 1830 to 1996 (Oxford University Press, 
1998).  
7 John Palmer and Co., Bodleian Library, Oxford; Gisborne and Co., Baring Brothers Archive, London; 
Ogilvy, Gillanders and Co., Flintshire Records Office, Wales; The Assam Company, London 
Metropolitan Archives. 
8 Robert Bates et al, Analytic Narratives (Princeton University Press, 1998).  
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dissolution, would encourage firms to use different business organisations including the joint-
stock or partnership, to mitigate these costs.9   
The thesis proposes that changes in the economic environment altered the transactions 
undertaken by the firms and incentivised the adoption of different forms of ownership. In turn, 
the internal organisation of the firms adapted to mitigate costs of agency caused by changes in 
ownership. If entrepreneurs had to deal with one dominant cost then a single business form that 
best mitigated it, would come to dominate. However, when multiple costs were present, 
entrepreneurs had to address various trade-offs and find a form that balanced competing 
pressures. This opens the question of whether one form could adequately address multiple costs 
effectively.  
The context in which the entrepreneurs made decisions is explored through their activities in 
two major export products: indigo and tea. India became the world’s largest exporter of indigo 
in the early 19th century and many trading firms had some involvement in the trade. Likewise, 
tea production expanded after 1840, and a tea boom in the 1860s saw many new entrants rush 
into the market. A detailed study of the products’ production and marketing helps to identify the 
opportunities and constraints that entrepreneurs faced in these markets.10  
To construct the case studies and context the thesis use a range of primary sources. In particular, 
correspondence, journals and account books from each of the firms, are fruitful sources for 
understanding the actions of the actors. Commercial registers provide a range of details including 
lists of different types of firms operating in Calcutta, the names of the partners and managers 
working for them, and other details such as nominal capital for joint-stock companies.11 The 
Barings archive contains a significant collection of 19th century business statistics collated by 
                                                          
9 Oliver Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting 
(Simon and Schuster, 1985). Lamoreaux, Naomi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. “Contractual Trade-offs 
and SMEs’ Choice of Organizational Form: A View from U.S. and French history, 1830–2000.” NBER 
Working Paper 12455 (2006). 
10 This analysis is undertaken through an adapted form of commodity chain analysis as proposed by 
Terrence Hopkins & Immanuel Wallerstein, “Commodity chains in the world economy,” Review, 10, 1 
(1986).  
11 British Library (BL) OIR 954.14 ST 1216 CH, Bengal Annual Register and Directory series. 
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the firm. It contains extensive data relating to prices and production for indigo and tea.12 Finally, 
various British parliamentary select committee reports contain interviews and statistics related 
to the development of trade and industry in Asia.13  
An evolving choice of business forms 
The first part of the thesis deals with the years between 1813 and 1850. In this period, the trade 
was slow to take-off and volatile, punctuated by credit crises in Calcutta in the early 1830s and 
in 1847. In part, this was due to the thin nature of the local credit market in Calcutta, with few 
banks or lenders attuned to the needs of the European traders. A detailed analysis of the indigo 
market shows that unpredictability in the levels of production led to volatility in supply and 
prices. These conditions encouraged experimentation with different structures of financing and 
different levels of integration of production. Commodity chain analysis highlighted the changing 
role played by the trading firms, moving from intermediaries and coordinators, to generators of 
credit, capital and information flows throughout the chain.  
From 1813 to the early 1830s, 25 to 30 agency houses, all partnerships, were active in Calcutta; 
amongst them John Palmer and Co. All the firm’s seven partners resided in Calcutta from where 
they conducted commission trade in various products and markets. This was done through a 
network of trading partners, entities external to the firm, and particularly with a corresponding 
house in Britain, Cockerell and Co. The firm advanced credit to indigo factory owners, and took 
full and partial ownership of over 40 factories as borrowers defaulted. By the 1820s the firm 
required over £400,000 of annual revolving credit to fund these activities. Roughly 50 per cent 
was provided by Cockerell and Co. in London, the rest generated by establishing deposit banking 
operations in Calcutta.  
                                                          
12 Barings Archive HC2 Statistics of General Trade series. 
13 Parliamentary inquiries included, House of Commons Report (HC) 690 1833 Report from the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Manufactures, Commerce, and Shipping, and HC 72-2 1861 East 
India Indigo Commission, papers related to indigo cultivation in Bengal. 
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The agency house structure broke down as a decline in the indigo market and overstretched 
banking operations led to a liquidity crisis in Calcutta. Palmer and Co. failed in 1830 when the 
contractual agreement for financing with Cockerell and Co. collapsed. In the aftermath the 
number of trading partnerships increased to 73 by 1845. There was growing diversity of the size 
and structure amongst these firms. Gisborne and Co. specialised in British textiles and purchased 
goods on their own account rather than on commission. Instead of a network of external trade 
associates, the firm placed partners in key markets. In the indigo sector the firm invested in, and 
managed, various factories. The firm experimented with different forms of ownership, including 
Multiple-shareholder firms, to better manage increased capital requirements needed to invest in 
more integrated systems of indigo production. The annual credit requirements, for trade and 
indigo, of around £200,000 were almost entirely financed through a contractual arrangement 
with the merchant bank Baring Brothers in London. 
The second part of the thesis details the rapid changes that occurred in the years between 1850 
and 1870. Changes in legislation in the 1850s significantly enhanced the benefits of the joint-
stock form and made incorporation easier. The period of study ends in 1870 when the opening 
of the Suez Canal and completion of the London to Calcutta telegraph line dramatically altered 
the business environment. The value of trade increased rapidly in this period, whilst the 
composition also changed as new industries such as jute and tea were established. The growth 
of the tea industry required extensive investment in the under developed region of Assam in the 
North East of India, which encouraged firms to fully integrate the whole chain of production and 
marketing activities. 
After 1850, tendencies towards specialisation and experimentation with ownership became more 
pronounced in industries which had growing levels of capital intensity, such as tea, jute and 
railways. The joint-stock form’s improved capacity to generate capital saw 173 incorporated 
firms operating in Calcutta by 1868, 70 of which were in the tea sector. The Assam Co. raised 
capital from shareholders in London and Calcutta to fund fixed capital investments in the 
construction of tea gardens and related infrastructure in Assam. The firm fully integrated 
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production and marketing functions between India and Britain, using a dual-board structure to 
coordinate activities. However, the separation of principals and agents, meta-physically and 
physically, offered great scope for opportunism. The Assam Co. faced significant difficulties in 
establishing control over agents in Assam, with ‘negligence and profusion’ an endemic feature 
of the operations.  
As the number of joint-stock firms increased, so did the number of firms providing managing 
agency services. Organised as partnerships, through a range of contractual governance 
mechanisms, the managing agents exerted extensive control over a portfolio of firms. This 
allowed small numbers of partners to channel investments into a range of industries, reducing 
their risk and exposure to capital intensive investments, but retaining close control over the 
firms.  
Between 1858 and 1868 the number of managing agents doubled and the firms controlled by 
agents quadrupled. Over 40 per cent of joint-stock firms operated with an agent by 1868. Ogilvy, 
Gillanders and Co. evolved from a trading partnership specialised in British textiles in the 1830s, 
to managing, promoting and owning joint-stock firms in industries including tea, railways, and 
jute from the 1850s. The firm retained the partnership form, and with over 12 partners and 
assistants and 100 Indian administrative staff provided a range of managerial services including 
the promotion of shares, coordination of finances and labour, whilst overseeing operations and 
reporting to the shareholders of the managed firms.  
Table 1 summarises the experimentation with different forms of ownership across the period. 
The change between partnership and joint-stock forms was accompanied by shifts between 
networked and integrated organisational structures. The failure of the agency house model in the 
1830s resulted in diversification and experimentation amongst the trading partnerships, with 
increasing specialisation in activities. After 1850, growing capital needs saw increased efforts 
to leverage the benefits of the joint-stock form, but within twenty years the joint-stock firms 
were increasingly subsumed or under the control of managing agents, which became the 
dominant form of business organisation by 1870.  
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Table 1. Summary of the four case studies 
Firm 
Ownership 
form 
Organisational 
structure 
Main activities 
Sites of 
operations 
Financing 
Key transaction 
characteristics and 
contracts 
Performance 
John Palmer 
and Co. 
Partnership 
Network of 
independent 
trading firms 
Commission trade, 
banking (deposit, 
loans and issues), 
indigo factories 
owned not managed 
Calcutta, Java 
Mix of 
external and 
internal 
Transactions for finance 
and indigo managed by 
contractual partnerships, 
weak contracts and 
governance between 
partners. 
Firm and type 
fails. 
Gisborne and 
Co. 
Partnership 
Network of 
partners 
Own account trade, 
indigo factories 
partially owned and 
managed 
Calcutta, 
Bombay, 
Liverpool, 
London, 
Bengal/Bihar 
Predominantly 
external 
Experiments with 
integration into indigo, 
improved contractual 
partnerships to secure 
finance 
Profitable,  
transitional form 
Assam Co. Joint-Stock 
Integrated 
producer and 
marketer 
Tea plantations fully 
owned and managed, 
direct sales of tea 
Calcutta, London, 
Assam 
Predominantly 
internal 
Fully integrated 
transactions for tea. 
Failure of governance to 
mitigate separation of 
owners and managers.  
Volatile profits, 
subsumed/reliant 
on managing 
agents 
Ogilvy, 
Gillanders 
and Co. 
Hybrid 
Network of 
partners and 
managed firms 
Own account trade, 
indigo factories 
owned and managed, 
management of 
firms 
Calcutta, 
Bombay, 
Liverpool, 
Manchester, 
London, Assam 
Mix although 
increasingly 
external 
Partial integration into 
tea, flexible partnerships 
and robust contracts with 
managed firms. 
Profitable and 
stable, 
proliferating form 
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The balance between transaction and agency costs 
To analyse why certain business forms were preferred the thesis drew on transaction and agency cost 
theories. The transactions for credit, capital, information on markets and trade products such as indigo 
and tea were the most regular across the period and the firms used a range of governance and contracting 
mechanisms to manage them.  
The thinness of the financial markets in Calcutta made market mechanisms ineffective for securing 
credit and capital, leading to the employment of more powerful governance instruments to manage these 
critical transactions. Palmer and Co. partially internalised these transactions by developing deposit 
banking functions. The Assam Co. internalised the transactions for capital through incorporation and 
the issuance of shares. Palmer and Co. and Gisborne and Co. both used partnerships with British based 
firms, Cockerell and Co. and Barings respectively, to access short and long-term credit. These 
arrangements reduced the threats of hold-up in the supply and the transaction costs incurred through 
repetitive use of the market.  
The increasing use of direct purchases and greater specialisation in British textiles in the 1830s, required 
the firms to put more capital at risk in geographically distant markets, changing the characteristics of 
these transactions. To reduce these risks Gisborne and Co. and Gillanders and Co. moved away from 
commission trade and market transactions, internalising these transactions by placing partners directly 
in key markets. This improved the flows of market information and lowered threats of opportunism and 
hold-up from external agents. 
Whilst transactions for indigo were undertaken by a full-range of governance mechanisms. High 
volatility in indigo production caused problems in market and resource coordination. The fear of hold-
up in supply, and desire to access better information on market conditions, incentivised Palmer and Co. 
to use partnerships with indigo planters rather than purchase through the market. The capacity to control 
costs and quality to improve profitability in the indigo production process further encouraged Gisborne 
and Co. and Gillanders and Co. to undertake full integration. A similar rationale was found in the tea 
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sector, where the high capital investments required to establish the gardens increased the asset 
specificity of the transactions for tea, leading to full integration through the joint-stock form.  
The decisions to use contractual partnerships or to fully internalise transactions had implications for the 
internal organisation and management of the firms which affected agency costs. The use of networks to 
manage activities at distance, and partnerships to access resources, required governance that could 
reduce the threats of opportunistic behaviour or minority repression between the parties. As Palmer and 
Co. and the Assam Co. found monitoring of the relationships and enforcement of the agreements was 
complicated and expensive when the parties were separated by distance. In the case of Palmer and Co. 
the failure to establish a contractually robust partnership for finance was central to the failure of the 
firm. Whilst Gisborne and Co. and Gillanders and Co. successfully experimented with contracts and 
incentives to better align the interests of the parties and reduce opportunism.  
Internalising transactions overcame the problems of opportunism between distant partners but raised 
various other issues. The decision of the Assam Co. to integrate transactions for tea was driven by the 
need to make larger investments in fixed assets, and mitigate the increasing costs of untimely 
dissolution. However, the growing scale and distribution of activities within the Assam Co. required 
coordination systems and governance to lower the threats of opportunism between the growing numbers 
of managers, who were geographically dispersed. The governance mechanisms within the joint-stock 
proved ineffectual in resolving these problems. The partnership form of the Managing Agents allowed 
Gillanders and Co. to attract and coordinate a growing number of high quality partners and assistants 
due to the incentives of profit share and capital investment. 
Managing agency capitalism  
These findings show that entrepreneurs sought adaptive organisational solutions to balance an evolving 
set of trade-offs between transaction and agency costs. Key to this process was the capacity of the 
partnership form to reduce the costs of agency incurred by firms operating with geographically distant 
actors. This resulted in the proliferation of the managing agent form. These findings reinterpret existing 
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explanations of the evolution of firms in the Anglo-Indian trade, showing that problems of managing 
agents at distance remained a key challenge throughout this period.  
The entrepreneurs in the Anglo-Indian trade did not see the choice of ownership as a dichotomy, with 
one form replacing the other. Instead, a symbiosis emerged between the forms, with the strengths of 
each adapted to mitigate the trade-offs faced by the firms. This evolution shows the entrepreneurs in 
the mid-19th century undertaking successful experiments in their use of ownership and organisational 
forms. Their approach to ownership suggests that far from being anachronistic rent-seekers retaining 
the partnership as a vehicle for family firms to extract profits, these entrepreneurs were innovative and 
flexible, capable of developing firm structures to meet the demands of the expanding and 
internationalising industries such as tea.  
More broadly these findings support the assertions that the integrated corporate firm should be seen as 
only one amongst many forms of business organisation that could compete and successfully grow global 
industries. A wide ecology of firm types was active and successful, even as the joint-stock form became 
readily available and more widely employed in the second half of the 19th century. The boundaries of 
the firm were pushed by entrepreneurs in this period to identify forms that allowed them to achieve the 
benefits of scale and align the interests of owners, investors and managers.  
Whilst the explanatory scope of the thesis is limited due to the discrete location of the cases it raises 
interesting questions about the choice of business organisation employed in other global markets. The 
managing agents have tended to be viewed as a British model of business organisation for managing 
overseas investments. If this was a distinctly British model the explanation for their emergence and 
existence would lie in cultural traits of British entrepreneurship and the financial and legal frameworks 
that bound London to the British Empire.  
If, however, the intuition of this thesis is correct, and the organisation evolved to reduce costs of agency, 
whilst allowing capital formation, then it could be expected that entrepreneurs of different nationalities 
would adopt similar forms of business organisation to address the challenges of long distance trade and 
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foreign direct investment. A case for a ‘Managing agency capitalism’ may be made if the form is found 
to have proliferated elsewhere.   
Further comparative analysis between firms of different national origins, including Dutch and US 
merchants in Asia, French merchants in Africa, and conversely firms of Asian origin, would enable a 
thorough analysis of these questions. The findings may illustrate different trajectories of 
internationalisation, but also identify common factors related to choice of ownership and organisation. 
They would also improve understanding of the effect that business organisation has had on the shape 
and velocity of globalization across the 19th century.  
 
 
